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Guarantee Options for a Settlement of the 
Conflict over Transnistria 
Any meaningful consideration of guarantee options requires some assumptions about the 
nature of the underlying settlement. With th is in mind, the following discussion draws on 
comparative experience in two ways. First, it considers the nature of the conflict over 
Transnistria in a broader context of similar conflicts elsewhere in order to establish the 
likely dimensions of a settlement. Second, it analyses a range of previous settlement 
proposals to identify any consensus in these dimensions in order to determine the possible 
parameters of a settlement in somewhat greater detail.  
While not detached from the reality of the conflict ov er Transnistria, this discussion is in 
equal measure speculative and hypothetical. It is not meant to commit either side in the 
conflict or any other party to anything, but to illustrate how different settlement options 
might be appropriately guaranteed. As a Document informing negotiators and mediators, 
the following should be read in conjunction with the more general examination in the 
companion paper “Guarantees and Conflict Settlements”.  
 
 
Stefan Wolff, November 2011 
ECMI Working Paper #51 
 
 
 
I. THE CONFLICT OVER 
TRANSNISTRIA IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
The conflict over Transnistria is a territorial dispute 
between two conflict parties: Transnistria and 
Moldova. At the heart of the conflict are questions of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, self-governance 
and joint governance, and appropriate guarantees for 
both a process of settlement and a final settlement 
itself. For close to two decades, the situation has been 
stagnant: a ceasefire agreement signed in 1992 in 
Moscow between the Russian and Moldovan 
presidents at the time—Yeltsin and Snegur—
established a trilateral peacekeeping mission (Russia, 
Moldova, Transnistria, later joined by Ukraine) and a 
security zone along the Dniestr/Nistru River. Protected 
by these arrangements and a continuing Russian 
military presence, Transnistria has developed into a de-
facto state of its own, albeit without international 
recognition and heavily dependent on Russia.  
In its core parameters, the conflict over 
Transnistria is not unique, and similar conflicts have 
been resolved successfully in the past. This experience 
suggests that any attempt to break the continuing 
deadlock and move toward a sustainable settlement 
short of changing currently recognised international 
boundaries has to provide a framework for a stable 
relationship between Transnistria and the rest of 
Moldova. Such a framework needs to account for the 
territorial status of Transnistria within Moldova (also 
bearing in mind the status of the existing Gagauz 
Autonomous Territorial Unit and possibly the status of 
the city of Bender, currently located in the security 
zone), the distribution of powers between Chisinau and 
Tiraspol, and the degree to which to which the two 
sides share power at the centre. In order to ensure that 
any agreements are implemented and subsequently 
operated fully and in good faith, it will be essential to 
incorporate dispute resolution mechanisms into a 
settlement. Two issues of the conflict have, in part, an 
international aspect that needs to be addressed in the 
negotiation process. These are the so-called Russian 
dimension of the conflict (the current and future 
presence of foreign troops and Moldovan 
demilitarization and neutrality) and the protection of 
identities of individuals and communities resident in 
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Transnistria and Moldova as a whole (sometimes more 
narrowly referred to as the Romanian dimension of the 
conflict, i.e., the possibility of future unification of 
Moldova with Romania). Any agreements achieved in 
these six areas will require strong and viable 
guarantees in domestic and international law, including 
security guarantees. 
II. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
PASTSETTLEMENT PROPOSALS 
 
Past settlement proposals for Transnistria broadly fall 
into two broad categories: those that are concerned 
with how to get to a settlement and those that are 
aimed at the what of the actual settlement provisions. It 
is the latter set of proposals that I shall focus on: 
‘Report No. 13 of the CSCE Mission to Moldova’ 
(1993), the ‘Memorandum on the Bases for 
Normalisation of Relations between the Republic of 
Moldova and Transnistria’ (1997), the ‘Russian Draft 
Memorandum on the Basic Principles of the State 
Structure of a United State in Moldova’ (2003, the 
Kozak Memorandum), the ‘Proposals and 
Recommendations of the Mediators from the OSCE, 
the Russian Federation, and Ukraine with regard to the 
Transdniestrian Settlement’ (2004), and the ‘Plan for 
the Settlement of the Transdniestrian Problem’ (2005, 
the Yushchenko or Poroshenko Plan). As required by 
the 2005 Ukrainian Plan, the Parliament of Moldova 
passed a law ‘On Fundamental Regulations of the 
Special Legal Status of Settlements on the Left Bank 
of the River Nistru (Transnistria)’ on 22 July 2005. 
More recent Moldovan thinking is captured in a 2007 
package proposal for a ‘Declaration concerning 
principles and guarantees of the Transnistrian 
settlement’ and, appended to it, a ‘Draft Law on the 
Special Legal Status of Transnistria’. Table 1 
summarises the content of the existing proposals. 
III. THE WAY FORWARD: 
ELEMENTS OF A SUSTAINABLE 
SETTLEMENT 
The existing proposals for the settlement of the 
Transnistrian conflict offer a wide range of different 
mechanisms to address the multiple and complex 
problems involved. Despite obvious differences, 
principal consensus exists in a number of areas and 
provides the foundation for offering a set of options 
consistent with the existing consensus. 
Territorial status 
There is considerable agreement across the existing 
proposals that the Transnistrian conflict requires some 
sort of territorial self-government as part of the 
political-institutional arrangements to be set up by a 
settlement. None of the proposals excludes such an 
option to be extended also to other areas in Moldova, 
notably Gagauzia (where it has existed since 1995) and 
Bender. Given the different local and local-centre 
dynamics in each of the three areas, in combination 
with the general reluctance on the part of Chisinau to 
federalise the country as a whole, a multiple 
asymmetric federacy arrangement would seem the 
most appropriate form of territorial state construction. 
Such a multiple asymmetric federacy 
arrangement would have several advantages. First, the 
existing arrangement with Gagauzia could remain 
untouched and/or further developed reflecting a 
changing situation there independently of the process 
and content of the Transnistrian settlement. Second, 
Chisinau and Tiraspol could directly negotiate the 
substance of Transnistria’s settlement (e.g., as foreseen 
in the various past proposals). Finally, the remainder of 
the territory of Moldova would remain largely 
unaffected in terms of existing governance structures.  
Such arrangements are not uncommon: 
devolution in the United Kingdom (although not 
properly a federacy arrangement because of a lack of 
constitutional entrenchment), the arrangements for 
Greenland and the Faroer Isles in Denmark, the five 
regions with a special autonomy statutes in Italy, and 
the autonomous communities in Spain all serve as 
relatively successful examples. Elements of the 1995 
Dayton Accords for Bosnia and Herzegovina are also 
worthwhile considering, as are provisions in Belgium. 
Beyond such multiple federacy arrangements, other 
relevant examples include the Åland Islands in 
Finland, Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, the 
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao in the 
Philippines, and Crimea in Ukraine. The arrangements 
for the Kurdistan Region of Iraq under the 2005 Iraqi 
constitution are another potentially useful case to draw 
on. 
Given the widespread use of different forms of 
territorial self-governance in conflict settlements, there 
is also a widely established and varied practice of 
guarantees on which mediators and negotiators could 
draw. Most commonly, federated entities are protected 
through status entrenchment in legislation and the 
constitution. This has already been accomplished for 
the status of Gagauzia: a constitutional anchoring of 
the status of Gagauzia as a special entity in Moldova 
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(currently Article 111 of the constitution) and an 
organic law (dating back to 1995) that specifies, 
among other things, the competences of Gagauzia. 
This could be applied to settlements for Transnistria 
and possibly Bender. At present, changes to his law 
require a three-fifths majority in parliament. This could 
be strengthened, in line with suggestions in the Kozak 
Memorandum and the Mediator Proposals, by 
requiring the consent of the parliament of the 
respective entity for any changes to its status or 
competences. Such a dual approach of constitutional 
and legal protection has the advantage of firmly 
entrenching the principle of self-governance in the 
constitution while offering the Sides greater flexibility 
in negotiating and revising the concrete ways in which 
the principle manifests itself in political practice. Spain 
(e.g., Catalonia), Italy (e.g., South Tyrol), Finland 
(Åland Islands), Denmark (e.g., Greenland), Indonesia 
(Aceh), and Ukraine (Crimea) all adopted this 
approach. The widespread use of this dual 
entrenchment mechanism strongly suggests that it 
should be considered for the settlement of the 
Transnistria conflict as well. 
 
In some cases, such domestic guarantees are 
complemented by further international guarantees. In 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, guarantees exist 
in the form of a multilateral international treaty—the 
Dayton Accords—to which the Constitution of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is appended as an integral part of the 
1995 settlement. This constitution defines the status 
and relationship between the Entities (Republika 
Srpska and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and 
the State. Within the Federation, a separate 
constitution defines the self-governing status of all 
cantons, which, reflecting primarily the Federation’s 
ethnic demography, are the principle loci of power and 
governance in the Federation. The status of Brčko, a 
territory disputed between the Federation and 
Republika Srpska, was decided by a mixed 
local/international arbitration tribunal to which the two 
Sides had committed at Dayton. The guarantee for the 
status of Brčko thus derives from both the Dayton 
Accords and an arbitration process, the implementation 
of which has been verified and monitored by the 
institution of the ‘Supervisor’, established under the 
Final Award. The example of Brčko may prove 
relevant for Moldova if the Sides cannot find a 
consensual solution for the status of Bender. 
The status of Northern Ireland is similarly 
guaranteed internationally. Here the guarantee takes 
the form of a bilateral treaty between the United 
Kingdom and Northern Ireland to which the 1998 
Agreement was appended. This has strengthened the 
otherwise weaker protection of the status of Northern 
Ireland in light of the absence of a written constitution 
in the UK where a simple act of parliament established 
the devolved administration in 1998. The explicit 
recognition of the UK’s international obligations under 
the 1998 Agreement between the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the Government of Ireland, however, mean that 
these devolution arrangements can no longer be 
abrogated or suspended unilaterally by the UK without 
explicit consent from the Government of the Republic 
of Ireland. Embedding Transnistria’s self-governing 
status in a bilateral treaty (between Moscow and 
Chisinau) would be an option for the Sides and could 
be explicitly linked with the full and final 
implementation of the 1992 Ceasefire Agreement.  
Northern Ireland, and the broader devolution 
settlement in the UK, is also of interest from the 
perspective of the use of in/formal, legally non-binding 
arrangements covering the relationship between 
Westminster and Belfast (as well as the other devolved 
authorities). This might be of interest for Moldova 
inasmuch as the Sides could commit to a range of 
principles that determine their mutual conduct in terms 
of coordinating legislation and policy between them, 
including through the creation of consultation bodies 
and a determination of their working procedures. 
Another option might be to make the currently existing 
Working Groups permanent or extend their existence 
into a transitional period, both with appropriately 
amended mandates and terms of reference.  
Returning to the issue of linking final conflict 
settlements to past agreements, and the declaration of 
such conflict settlements as being in fulfilment of such 
past agreements, has also been used in the case of 
South Tyrol. Here the 1946 Gruber-DeGasperri 
Agreement established the principle of self-
government for South Tyrol, and the 1972 Autonomy 
Statute for the province was considered by the sides as 
fulfilling Italy’s obligation under the 1946 bilateral 
agreement, which in itself was appended to the peace 
treaty between the Allies and Italy at the end of the 
Second World War. The dispute between Austria and 
Italy over the fulfilment of the 1946 Agreement was 
finally resolved in 1992 when Austria issued its 
Declaration of Conflict Settlement.
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Table 1: A Comparative Summary of Provisions in Past Settlement Proposals for the Transnistrian Conflict 
 
 Territorial Status 
Distribution of 
Powers 
Power Sharing Dispute Resolution 
‘Russian’ 
Dimension 
‘Romanian’ 
Dimension 
(Security) Guarantees 
C
SC
E 
R
ep
o
rt
 (
1
9
9
3
)  Special status 
for Transnistria, 
possibly for 
Bender and 
Gagauzia, 
possibly 
regionalised 
state 
 Exclusive and 
joint 
competences 
listed in detail 
 
 Proportional representation for 
Transnistria in parliament, top 
courts and key ministries 
  Complete 
demilitarization 
 Russian 
withdrawal 
 Option for 
Transnistrian 
Secession 
 International guarantees, 
especially CSCE mediation of a 
agreement 
M
o
sc
o
w
 M
em
o
ra
n
d
u
m
 (
1
9
9
7
) 
 Status  
Transnistria 
based on state-
legal relations 
between 
Transnistria and 
Moldova within 
a common state 
 Division and 
delegation of 
competences 
 Transnistria to 
participate in 
Moldovan foreign 
policy and to 
have its own 
international 
contacts subject 
to mutual 
agreement 
 Both sides’ agreement required 
for foreign policy decisions 
affecting Transnistria 
 Both sides’ agreement required 
for Transnistrian international 
contacts 
 Each side able to approach 
guarantors in case of violations, 
with guarantors to take measures 
for ‘normalisation’ 
   Both sides as mutual guarantors 
of their agreement on the status 
of Transnistria 
 Ukraine and Russia to act as 
guarantors for the provisions in 
the Memorandum and of any 
future status agreement 
 OSCE to monitor compliance  
 Joint PKF to continue 
 Each side able to approach 
guarantors in case of violations 
 Full system of guarantees to be 
worked out among parties in 
negotiations 
K
o
za
k 
M
em
o
ra
n
d
u
m
 
(2
0
0
3
) 
 Two federacy 
arrangements: 
Moldova-
Transnistria and 
Moldova-
Gagauzia 
 Exclusive and 
joint 
competences 
listed in detail; 
 Residual 
authority with 
federal subjects 
 Pre-determined number of 
seats for Transnistria and 
Gagauzia in Constitutional 
Court and Senate; 
 Qualified majorities in Senate 
and Constitutional Court during 
transition period 
 Consultation on international 
treaties affecting joint 
competences 
 Moldova as a 
neutral, 
demilitarized 
state 
 Option for 
Transnistrian 
Secession 
 Constitutional entrenchment of 
status, combined with qualified 
majorities necessary for 
constitutional amendments  
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M
ed
ia
to
r 
P
ro
p
o
sa
ls
 
(2
0
0
4
) 
 Federal State 
with 
Transnistria as a 
federal subject 
 Exclusive and 
joint 
competences 
listed in detail; 
 Residual 
authority with 
federal subjects 
 Two-thirds majority in both 
houses of parliament for 
constitutional laws 
 Federal state institutions to effect 
policy coordination; 
 Disagreements over competences 
to be arbitrated by Constitutional 
Court; 
 Disagreements over 
implementation to be resolved in 
existing negotiation format or 
separate conciliation mechanism 
 Reduction of 
military capacity 
up to 
demilitarization 
 Option for 
Transnistrian 
Secession 
 Integrated system of 
international, domestic, 
economic, military and political 
guarantees, including 
enforcement mechanisms 
U
kr
ai
n
ia
n
 P
la
n
 
(2
0
0
5
) 
 Special status 
for Transnistria 
 Division of 
powers to be 
established in 
organic special-
status law 
 Joint drafting of special-status 
law  
 Conciliation Committee with 
international participation to 
resolve disputes over compliance 
with/ interpretation of special-
status law 
  Option for 
Transnistrian 
Secession 
 Domestic legal and multilateral 
international guarantees; 
 Guarantor states and OSCE 
entitled to further international 
legal steps in case of non-
compliance 
M
o
ld
o
va
n
 
Fr
am
ew
o
rk
 
La
w
 (
2
0
0
5
) 
 Special status 
for Transnistria 
 Division of 
powers to be 
established in 
organic special-
status law 
 Joint drafting of special-status 
law 
  Transnistrian 
demilitarization 
and Russian 
withdrawal as 
preconditions for 
settlement 
  A system of internal guarantees 
to accompany the special-status 
law 
M
o
ld
o
va
n
 P
ac
ka
ge
 
P
ro
p
o
sa
ls
  (
2
0
0
7
) 
 Special status 
for Transnistria 
 Division of 
powers to be 
established in 
special-status law 
 Joint drafting of special-status 
law 
 Proportional representation for 
Transnistria in parliament 
 Representation in government, 
Constitutional and Supreme 
Courts, Security Council, 
Prosecutor-General’s Office 
and Interior Ministry 
 Disagreements over competences 
to be arbitrated by Constitutional 
Court 
 Moldova as a 
neutral, non-
aligned state 
 Russian 
withdrawal 
 No foreign 
military bases or 
facilities in 
Moldova 
 Option for 
Transnistrian 
Secession 
 A system of internal legal, 
political and economic 
guarantees 
 International mission under 
OSCE mandate to monitor 
demilitarisation and creation of 
joint armed forces 
 ECMI- Working Paper 
 
 
8 | P a g e  
 
In the case of the conflict over 
Transnistria, a similar declaration by Moscow, 
or possibly a joint declaration by Moscow and 
Chisinau, subsequent to a final settlement of the 
status of Transnistria that this settlement 
constitutes the full and final implementation of 
the 1992 Ceasefire Agreement would provide a 
further international guarantee, strengthening 
also the future international protection of 
Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity 
alongside a guarantee for Transnistria’s self-
governing status. 
Finally, it is worth considering the case 
of the Åland Islands. Here, a dual constitutional 
and legal protection in the domestic legal order 
of Finland is combined with an international 
anchor in the form of a report by the League of 
Nations on the recommended settlement in 1921 
on the basis of which the first Autonomy Statute 
for the Åland Islands was drawn up. Linking a 
final status determination for Transnistria with a 
UN Security Council Resolution (or, less 
preferably a General Assembly Resolution) 
could provide yet another international 
guarantee satisfying concerns of both sides. 
 
The distribution of powers 
All existing proposals recognise the importance 
of distributing powers clearly between Chisinau 
and Tiraspol, but differ in the level of detail and 
nature of their approach. Especially in post-
conflict settings, it is potentially problematic to 
operate with exclusive and joint competences in 
the way in which the CSCE Report, the Kozak 
Memorandum, and the Mediator Proposals do. 
Rather than having two lists of exclusive 
competences, a multiple asymmetric federacy 
arrangement lends itself more to clearly defining 
the competences of the federated entities (which 
could be different for Tiraspol compared to 
Komrat and/or Bender) while leaving all others 
(i.e., anything not specifically assigned to an 
entity), and thus residual authority, to the centre. 
At the same time, this would not preclude 
mentioning a few specific competences for the 
centre (such as defence, fiscal and currency 
policy, citizenship) as long as this is understood 
as an open-ended list including all but those 
powers specifically assigned to an entity. This is 
the pattern of distributing powers in a number of 
comparable cases, including Belgium (e.g., 
Brussels) and Ukraine (Crimea). In Moldova 
itself, this model currently applies to Gagauzia 
and should be extended as a principle of 
constitutional design (but not necessarily in the 
specifics of the substance of assigned powers) to 
a settlement with Transnistria in order to 
preserve the uniformity of the legal order of 
Moldova.   
In the case of South Tyrol (Italy), a 
different approach to distributing competences 
has been adopted which distinguishes between 
exclusive state competences and concurrent 
competences (i.e., shared between state and 
region), while all other policy areas not 
specifically reserved for the centre fall 
automatically under the remit of regional 
legislative competence. Thus, regions are 
sources of residual authority. This approach is 
also taken in the 2005 Constitution of Iraq and 
the 1995 Dayton constitution for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (albeit the latter without providing 
for concurrent competences).  
The use of concurrent competences 
(occasionally also referred to as shared or joint 
competences) makes it worthwhile considering 
the notions of primary and secondary legislative 
competences, implicitly reflected in the 2004 
Mediator Proposals. This distinction has its 
source in the legal boundaries to which they are 
confined. Primary legislative competences (i.e., 
the areas in which Transnistria/Gagauzia/Bender 
would enjoy exclusive powers) would then only 
have constraints in the Moldovan constitution 
and the country’s international obligations. 
Secondary legislation, that is legislation in areas 
of potentially concurrent/joint/shared 
competences, would be constrained by 
framework legislation in which Chisinau 
determines the basic principles of legislation 
while the federated entities make the detailed 
arrangements as they are to apply in their 
territories. As there are normally also provisions 
for additional delegated powers (i.e., areas in 
which the centre has exclusive legislative 
competence but delegates this to the entity), the 
 ECMI- Working Paper 
 
 
9 | P a g e  
 
notion of tertiary legislative competence might 
be useful constraining local legislation in two 
ways. First, it is only in specifically ‘delegated’ 
policy areas beyond the stipulations of a 
constitutional or other legal arrangement 
defining entity competences in which such 
competence could be exercised. Second, entity 
legislation would have to comply with a range of 
particular constraints specified in individual 
cases of delegated legislative competence, as 
well as with the more general constraints 
imposed on primary and secondary 
competences.  
Guarantees for the distribution of 
powers between centre and federated 
entity/entities work on a similar basis as they do 
for territorial status: primarily through 
constitutional and other forms of legal 
entrenchment. Territorial state construction, 
including the distribution of powers between 
different layers of authority is normally 
enshrined in some form in a country’s 
constitution. This guarantee mechanism, thus, 
derives its protective power from the status that 
the constitution has in the legal order, including 
crucially procedures for constitutional 
amendment. The constitution of Italy, for 
example, defines a variety of exclusive 
competences for the centre and areas in which 
centre and regions concurrently exercise 
legislative powers, leaving all other policy areas 
in the competence of regions. Constitutional 
amendments require an absolute majority in both 
chambers of the Italian parliament. Unless they 
were carried by a two-thirds majority in both 
chambers, constitutional amendments can be 
challenged by a referendum if at least 20% of 
the deputies of one chamber, 500,000 voters or 
five regional legislative assemblies demand a 
referendum. A second layer of protection for the 
competences required by the regions in Italy 
exists in the form of the constitutional laws that 
establish their respective regional autonomy 
statutes. These statutes are more detailed than 
the constitutional provisions, but are protected as 
constitutional laws by the same amendment (or 
replacement) procedures as changes to the 
constitution itself.  
Similar principles apply to the 
protection of the distribution of powers between 
the Åland authorities and the government in 
Finland. However, the parallel majority required 
here concerns a vote in the Finnish parliament 
(subject to the same provisions required for 
constitutional amendments) and in the Åland 
legislature (with a minimum two-thirds majority 
in favour). Even though these arrangements do 
not give an option for a referendum, they 
nonetheless represent a stronger degree of 
protection as they directly involve the entity 
rather than its representatives in the centre and 
as they elevate the Åland autonomy statute to a 
level comparable to the constitution itself 
because of the required amendment procedures 
in the Finnish parliament. At the same time, the 
1991 Act on the Autonomy of Åland also 
requires consultation with, and the consent of, 
the Åland parliament before any Constitutional 
Act or another State Act ‘of special importance 
to Åland’ can enter into force in Åland. In the 
case of the settlement of the Transnistrian 
conflict, such a provision could prove useful to 
assure the Transnistrian of additional guarantees 
for the future protection of its status, including 
by naming particular areas of legislation if 
deemed necessary by the Sides. 
The constitutions of Ukraine and Crimea 
offer another example of how a distribution of 
competences between centre and entity can be 
guaranteed. The Ukrainian constitution includes 
a separate title on Crimea which lists in detail 
the areas in which the Crimean authorities have 
law-making and other regulatory competences. 
Any changes to this title require a two-thirds 
majority in the Ukrainian parliament. The 
Crimean constitution, approved by a Law of 
Ukraine, spells out the relevant competences in 
greater detail and restricts the ability of the 
Crimean parliament to initiate legislation that 
would limit the powers of Crimean authorities as 
determined by the Constitution and other laws of 
Ukraine to situations in which such limitations 
have secured prior approval in a local (advisory) 
referendum. This, however, constitutes only a 
relatively weak guarantee against potentially 
pro-centralising Crimean authorities. 
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The Iraqi constitution of 2005, in 
contrast, goes much further in protecting the 
powers granted to the regions: it specifically 
provides that articles of the constitution may not 
be amended if they diminish the powers of the 
regions unless approval for such amendments is 
gained in the legislature and in a referendum in 
the region concerned. Under the 2005 Iraqi 
constitution, only one region was specifically 
recognised—Iraqi Kurdistan—while general 
provisions were made for the formation of 
additional regions. For Moldova, the question 
arises to which extent different guarantees might 
be considered for Transnistria that may not 
apply in the same way to other entities such as 
Gagauzia and potentially Bender. If this were 
deemed useful and feasible, competences 
assigned to Transnistria as part of a final 
settlement and entrenched in the constitution and 
other legislation could be additionally protected 
by requiring any amendments to be subject to a 
(qualified) majority in the Transnistrian 
parliament and/or a referendum in the entity. A 
referendum may or may not be mandatory for 
changes to (particularly specified/pre-
determined) areas of Transnistrian legislative 
competence. If not mandatory, trigger 
mechanisms, such as those specified in relation 
to the passage of constitutional laws in Italy, 
could be considered (e.g., a request by certain 
percentage of deputies in the Transnistrian 
legislature or of voters registered in 
Transnistria). 
In a number of comparable cases, 
international guarantees for the distribution of 
competences exist as well, mostly indirectly by 
way of guarantees of a whole settlement as 
discussed in the preceding section on status 
guarantees. 
Power sharing  
Power-sharing arrangements can be established 
qua representation and participation rules across 
the three branches of government (executive, 
legislature, and judiciary) and the civil service.  
Executive power sharing is often seen as 
central among power-sharing arrangements and 
taken to include representation in the executive, 
in this case of representatives of the territorial 
entities concerned (i.e., 
Transnistria/Gagauzia/Bender). Representation 
of particular segments of society, including 
those defined on the basis of territory, can be 
achieved in different ways. Most relevant for the 
proposed multiple asymmetric federacy would 
be through a formal arrangement that makes the 
heads of the federated executives members of 
the central cabinet (and has a similar 
requirement for line ministries). Moldova 
already has experience with this mechanism in 
relation to Gagauzia. It would guarantee a 
minimum of representation without the need for 
unwieldy, overblown executives, and it would 
serve as one mechanism for policy coordination 
(see below). In line with the Kozak 
Memorandum, heads of federated executives 
could be given deputy prime ministerial 
positions, and meaningful representation of the 
federated entities at the centre could be further 
increased by creating a special ministry (or 
ministries or ministerial offices) to deal with 
affairs of the entities (similar to the UK 
Secretaries of State for Scotland/Wales/Northern 
Ireland or the Minister for London between 1994 
and 2010). 
As far as legislative power sharing goes, 
a multiple asymmetric federacy arrangement 
would not require a bicameral system as 
foreseen in the Kozak Memorandum or the 
Mediator Proposals. Representation of the 
entities can be ensured through the choice of an 
electoral system that results in proportional 
outcomes. In the case of Moldova, because of 
the proposed territorial state construction, open 
or closed List-PR in a single state-wide 
constituency (possibly with threshold 
exemptions for regional parties), plurality 
single-member (e.g., ‘first-past-the-post’ or 
Alternative Vote) or preferential multi-member 
constituencies (e.g., Single Transferable Vote) 
would all result in reasonably proportional 
outcomes.  
In terms of the effective participation 
dimension of power sharing, the parties could 
agree the use of qualified and/or concurrent 
majorities for parliamentary decisions in specific 
areas (either pre-determined or triggered 
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according to a particular procedure), thus 
establishing a limited veto power for territorial 
entities even in the absence of an upper house. 
Such an arrangement, however, would also 
require that members of parliament ‘designate’ 
themselves as representing a particular territorial 
entity (i.e., Transnistria/Gagauzia/Bender).  
Judicial power sharing could be assured 
through mandatory representation of judges 
nominated by the legislative bodies of the 
federated entities in the highest courts, 
especially the constitutional court and/or the 
supreme court. In each of the entities, a regional 
branch of these courts could be established, 
serving as highest-instance court for matters 
pertaining to the legislative framework of the 
entity in question, while still being part of the 
unified judicial system of Moldova. Similar to 
the proposals in the Kozak Memorandum, a 
transitional period could require qualified 
majorities for decisions to be adopted in the 
Constitutional Court. 
In order to strengthen links between the 
centre and the federated entities, giving the latter 
a stake also in the political process of Moldova 
as a whole, proportional representation, 
including at senior levels, could be required for 
the civil service. For a transitional period, this 
could also include differential recruitment in 
order to overcome historically grown 
imbalances. The policing bill for Northern 
Ireland, for example, makes it mandatory to 
recruit new members of the police force in equal 
numbers from the Catholic and Protestant 
communities, while the constitution of 
Macedonia stipulates that equitable 
representation of persons belonging to all 
communities in public bodies at all levels and in 
other areas of public life is guaranteed under the 
constitution as amended by the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement. 
When it comes to guarantees for power-
sharing arrangements, it is important to bear in 
mind that especially legislative power sharing 
itself serves as an important guarantee 
mechanism: by requiring qualified or concurrent 
majorities for certain legislative acts, provisions 
of conflict settlements can be protected against 
unilateral abrogation. This, of course, extends to 
power-sharing arrangements as well, which are 
otherwise enshrined in constitutions and other 
legislative acts regulating the implementation 
and operation of conflict settlements. By way of 
example, the Belgian constitution offers a 
number of good examples for constitutional 
guarantees of power sharing. Executive power 
sharing is guaranteed by a provision that 
requires the cabinet (minus the office of the 
prime minister) to be composed in equal 
numbers of members of the French and Dutch-
speaking communities. It guarantees legislative 
power sharing, qua representation, by providing 
for a specific number of Senators from each of 
the regions and communities, and for a 
proportional electoral system to the House of 
Representatives. The participatory dimension of 
power sharing is enshrined in the constitution for 
legislation is particular policy areas by requiring 
a majority of the votes cast in each linguistic 
group in each House for the approval of relevant 
bills. Power sharing in the judiciary, qua 
representation, is guaranteed more indirectly in 
the constitution by providing for a High Council 
of Justice, composed of two colleges of equal 
size made up of members of the French and 
Dutch-speaking communities, respectively, with 
competence for the nomination and appointment 
of judges. Similar provisions in one or more 
areas of power sharing can be found in a number 
of other conflict settlements, including the 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina under 
the Dayton Accords, the Iraqi constitution of 
2005, the constitution of Macedonia and the 
constitution of Bougainville.  
In the case of a settlement of the 
Transnistrian conflict, some power-sharing 
provisions will require entrenchment in the 
constitution and others in a ‘special status law’. 
Thus, provisions relating to specific 
parliamentary voting procedures (qualified or 
concurrent majorities) and the policy areas to 
which they apply or the procedure by which they 
are triggered should be enshrined in the 
constitution. Similarly, the composition of a 
constitutional court (including the prescription 
of a nominations or appointments procedure) 
and its decision-making procedures should be 
part of the constitution. Provisions for executive 
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power sharing, such as the co-optation of 
members of the Transnistrian executive into the 
corresponding bodies at the centre, the creation 
of a Transnistria ministry, and any regulations 
for recruitment, appointment and promotions in 
the civil service would, in line with existing 
international practice, be better enshrined in a 
‘special status law’, thus also enjoying 
additional guarantees derived from the 
mechanisms that protect such a law from 
unilateral change. 
Dispute resolution  
Similar to power sharing, mechanisms and 
procedures for dispute resolution serve in part as 
guarantees while also requiring guarantees for 
their effective implementation and operation. As 
a guarantee mechanism, dispute resolution is 
about the forms of redress that the Sides would 
have access to, for example, if the federated 
entity considers that the central government has 
overstepped its legislative competence and 
passed laws that infringe on entity competences. 
The existing proposals are relatively 
silent on this important dimension of sustainable 
conflict settlement, yet to the extent that there is 
consensus it extends to two particular areas. 
First, there is a recognised need for judicial 
review and arbitration, including considering the 
constitutionality of legislation for the 
implementation of existing agreements and 
potentially involving the Constitutional Court as 
ultimate arbiter, as practised in the case of South 
Tyrol, Åland Islands, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and Ukraine. Closely connected to this is the 
issue of burden of proof. For example, in both 
the cases of South Tyrol and the Åland Islands, 
it is upon state authorities to challenge 
legislative acts of the entities and to do so within 
a prescribed time frame of two and four months, 
respectively. In other words, entities do not have 
to prove that their legislation complies with the 
overall legal framework of the state, but the 
burden of proof lies with the central 
government. More generally, the underlying 
principle here is that the side that challenges a 
particular law or policy needs to prove its case. 
In the case of Moldova, an option of referral to 
the constitutional court should be considered in 
the case of any disputes, for example over the 
exercise of legislative competences and their 
compliance with the country’s constitutional 
order and international obligations. Such a 
procedure can be guaranteed by enshrining this 
mechanism of dispute resolution in the 
constitution as one of the tasks in the remit of 
the constitutional court, as is the case with the 
constitutions of Belgium, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Ukraine. As part of a special 
status law, such a guarantee could be further 
specified by determining who has access to this 
form of legal redress, e.g., the central and entity 
governments, a specified number of deputies in 
the central and entity parliaments, and/or private 
citizens. 
While it is clearly important to have 
procedures judicial review and arbitration in 
place, other mechanisms might be useful to 
prevent recourse to such ultimate mechanisms. 
This is another area where some, at least 
implicit, consensus exists in the form of 
establishing specific conciliation mechanisms to 
deal with the interpretation and implementation 
of a settlement agreement. The Belgian 
constitution offers a good example here with the 
so-called ‘alarm bell’ mechanism. Under this 
provision, a motion signed by at least three-
quarters of the members of one of the linguistic 
groups can trigger a suspension of parliamentary 
procedure and a delay in a vote on bill that the 
members of that group consider damaging for 
relations between the Communities. The bill 
would then be referred to the Council of 
Ministers to reconsider and, if necessary amend, 
the bill before presenting it again to parliament 
for a vote. This procedure can only be invoked 
once by the same group for the same bill and 
does not apply to laws requiring a special 
majority or budget laws. A similar procedure is 
enshrined in the Macedonian constitution. While 
requiring a concurrent majority in the parliament 
for decisions that affect cultural/identity matters, 
the constitution foresees the possibility of 
disputes over the applicability of this voting 
procedure and requires such disputes to be 
resolved by the Committee on Inter-Community 
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Relations, itself a statutory body established by 
the constitution.  
The underlying principle of a mandatory 
conciliation procedure triggered in a particular 
way, exemplified by the cases of Belgium and 
Macedonia, is somewhat reflected in the 2005 
Ukrainian proposals and should be considered 
for inclusion in a final settlement. It could be 
guaranteed as a permanent mechanism in the 
Moldovan constitution or as a feature of a 
transitional, time-limited nature in a special 
status law. 
In addition to conciliation mechanisms, 
which are normally invoked after a difference 
cannot be resolved in another way (but before 
taking the matter to a court), joint committees 
and implementation bodies should be established 
to find common interpretations for specific 
aspects of agreements and regulations and to 
coordinate the implementation of specific 
policies at national and regional levels, including 
the joint drafting of implementation legislation. 
Here, the Sides might wish to enter into a formal 
agreement on making permanent the existing 
working groups and use them as coordination 
bodies and thus as another mechanism for 
dispute avoidance. 
The protection of identities 
More narrowly, the protection of identities is 
encapsulated in the issue of potential future 
unification with Romania. This could be 
addressed similarly to what already exists in the 
settlement for Gagauzia (and has been widely 
accepted in most existing proposals in relation to 
Transnistria), namely that Transnistria should 
have an option of seceding from Moldova in 
case of unification with Romania.  
However, this narrow reading of identity 
protection as simply the ‘Romanian’ dimension 
of a final settlement masks a broader issue that 
affects all the communities resident in 
Transnistria and, for that matter, in Moldova as a 
whole. In the vast majority of similar conflicts, 
the protection of the rights of individuals and 
communities to have, express, and develop a 
specific ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and/or 
religious identity is addressed by making 
relevant international standards directly 
applicable, by enshrining particular rights into a 
constitution, and by enacting human and 
minority rights bills, including mechanisms for 
implementation, monitoring, complaints and 
redress. Relevant examples in this respect 
extend, among others, to the 1995 Dayton 
Accords for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 2001 
Ohrid Framework Agreement for Macedonia, 
the 1998 Northern Ireland Agreement, and the 
current arrangements in Belgium. 
Thus, the Macedonian constitution as 
amended pursuant to the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement specifically recognises members of 
communities other than ethnic Macedonians as 
equal citizens who have the right freely to 
express, maintain and develop their identity, that 
the protection of their identities is guaranteed by 
the state, and that they have the right to establish 
their own cultural and educational institutions. 
Given the centrality of language to identity, the 
constitution also stipulates that any language 
other than Macedonian which is spoken by at 
least 20% of the population has the status of an 
official language alongside Macedonian and that 
members of communities have the right to 
instruction in their language in primary and 
secondary education, while also requiring them 
to study Macedonian. Alongside this 
constitutional guarantee, and as a further 
procedural guarantee (in the form of a legislative 
power sharing mechanism), the constitution also 
requires that for laws that directly affect culture, 
use of language, education, personal 
documentation, and use of symbols, a concurrent 
majority is required among deputies belonging 
to communities other than ethnic Macedonians. 
In the case of Moldova and Transnistria, 
relevant provisions for the protection of people’s 
individual identities should apply to the entire 
territory of the state. Apart from a specific 
recognition of Moldova’s diversity and a 
constitutional prohibition of any form of 
discrimination, guarantees for such provisions 
should thus be enshrined in the constitution in 
several ways: as specific enumeration of rights, 
by requiring concurrent or qualified majorities 
for the passage of any laws affecting such rights, 
and in the form of the direct applicability of 
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relevant international standards (e.g., the 
Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for 
the Protection of Minorities). In addition, any 
special status law for Transnistria could require 
similar provisions to be incorporated into a 
Transnistrian constitution as a way of ensuring 
that the different communities resident in 
Transnistria are equally protected within the 
framework of Transnistrian legislation. In terms 
of formal and informal agreements, the Sides 
may wish to establish a framework of 
regulations and standards for a common national 
curriculum, including minimum standards for 
language acquisition in the relevant official 
languages. 
The Russian dimension 
How to deal with the questions of 
demilitarization, neutrality and the presence of 
foreign troops could be the most decisive issue 
to determine whether a negotiated settlement for 
Transnistria will be possible. It will require an 
international agreement, rather than merely an 
arrangement between Chisinau and Tiraspol. At 
the same time, it could also be an area where a 
‘grand bargain’ among all the parties involved 
can be achieved, linking these three issues to 
those of the territorial integrity and sovereignty 
of Moldova, thus including interlocking 
protections for all sides involved.  
As a model for such an arrangement, the 
1991 ‘Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, 
Independence, Territorial Integrity and 
Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of 
Cambodia’ should be considered. Here, the 
nineteen states participating in the Paris 
Conference on Cambodia signed, among others, 
this agreement in which Cambodia committed 
itself to a wide range of principles for its future 
domestic and international conduct, including to 
‘maintain, preserve and defend its sovereignty, 
independence, territorial integrity and 
inviolability, neutrality, and national unity’, to 
entrench its ‘perpetual neutrality ... in the ... 
constitution’,  ‘refrain from entering into any 
military alliances or other military agreements 
with other States that would be inconsistent with 
its neutrality’, and ‘refrain from permitting the 
introduction or stationing of foreign forces, 
including military personnel, in any form 
whatsoever, in Cambodia, and to prevent the 
establishment or maintenance of foreign military 
bases’. In return, the other signatory states 
undertook ‘to recognize and to respect in every 
way the sovereignty, independence, territorial 
integrity and inviolability, neutrality and 
national unity of Cambodia.’ 
A similar set of arrangements was 
included in the 2004 Annan Plan for Cyprus, 
drawing in part on the existing Treaty of 
Guarantee, and determining its applicability to 
the independence, territorial integrity, security 
and constitutional order of the United Cyprus 
Republic, the territorial integrity, security and 
constitutional order of the constituent states. 
Moreover, the Annan Plan proposed that Cyprus 
shall not put its territory at the disposal of 
international military operations other than with 
the consent of both constituent states and the 
consent of Greece and Turkey. This is a 
somewhat softer option compared to the 
absolute requirement of neutrality in the 
Cambodian settlement. However, the 
Foundation Agreement, also part of the 2004 
Annan Plan, requires that there be no 
paramilitary or reserve forces or military or 
paramilitary training of citizens and that all 
weapons,  except for licensed sports guns, be 
banned.  
While both the situations in Cambodia 
and Cyprus were clearly different from that in 
Moldova, the way in which they were dealt with 
in the relevant (proposed) settlements is highly 
relevant as a broad international guarantee 
because it addresses the core issues of the 
Russian dimension of the conflict, while at the 
same time providing an international anchor for 
Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
Under such an arrangement, Moldova would 
gain a Russian commitment to its sovereignty 
and territorial integrity in exchange for agreeing 
not to join NATO. The latter dimension—
permanent neutrality—in turn would need to be 
enshrined in the Moldovan constitution and a 
provision would need to be made to exempt this 
article from any future constitutional 
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amendment. The Sides may also wish to 
consider some degree of demilitarisation. 
Security guarantees  
Security guarantees are part of an overall 
guarantees package across the four dimensions 
of guarantee options. In the sense of ‘hard’ 
security guarantees (as opposed to issues related 
to the security of territorial status, power-sharing 
arrangements, or identities), they warrant 
separate treatment. In the specific context of the 
Transnistrian conflict they relate to three 
particular aspects: the future of the existing Joint 
Peacekeeping Force, the integration (or not) of 
Moldovan and Transnistrian security forces, and 
a range of issues related to the so-called Russian 
dimension, including questions of neutrality and 
demilitarisation. As the latter aspect has been 
dealt with in the previous section, I shall focus 
on the former two aspects.  
A comparative analysis of existing 
proposals reveals both a lack of detail in terms 
of relevant provisions and a similar lack of 
consensus among the three existing proposals 
that touch upon security guarantees. To the 
extent that any provisions are included, the 1997 
Moscow Memorandum proposes the 
continuation of the Joint Peacekeeping Force, 
while the 2004 Mediator Proposals merely note 
that an integrated system of international, 
domestic, economic, military and political 
guarantees, including enforcement mechanisms 
needs to be worked out as part of the 
negotiations for a final settlement. The 2007 
Moldovan Package Proposals suggest that an 
international mission under OSCE mandate be 
set up to monitor demilitarisation and the 
creation of joint armed forces.  
 
There is, however, quite a rich international 
practice beyond Moldova on how to deal with 
security guarantees in similar situations, where 
conflict settlements include provisions for both 
peacekeeping forces and, broadly speaking, 
security sector reform of which questions 
pertaining to the integration of forces are one 
important dimension. Peacekeeping forces 
usually fulfil a dual role: they provide hard 
security guarantees in the form of an armed 
force ensuring that there is no resurgence of 
violence and they monitor and verify the 
implementation of an entire agreement or 
specific parts thereof. This is the case, for 
example, with relevant provisions in the 2004 
Annan Plan for Cyprus, in the 1999 ceasefire 
agreement for the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, and in the 2003 Linas-Marcoussis 
Agreement for Ivory Coast.  
Two further sets of arrangements appear 
particularly relevant for the context of the 
settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. In the 
1998 Guinea-Bissau agreement, the ECOMOG 
peacekeeping force that is mandated under the 
terms of this agreement assumes additional 
responsibility for border control. In the 1997 
Protocol on Military Issues that is part of the 
negotiated settlement of the Tajik civil war, the 
existing CIS peacekeeping force was placed 
under UN supervision while carrying out 
specific tasks related to the disarmament of 
opposition forces and the decommissioning of 
their weapons.  
Security guarantees, to the extent that 
they relate to the presence of a peacekeeping 
force in Moldova, could thus take the following 
form in a final settlement. An international 
observer mission under UN mandate could 
assume overall authority over the existing 
peacekeeping force and also integrate the current 
EUBAM (the latter in all probability with an 
adjusted mandate and deployment area). It 
should also incorporate the currently existing 
Joint Control Commission and the working 
group on security issues, adding to them an 
international component and assuming their 
tasks. The existing security zone and 
checkpoints would need to be dismantled and 
the existing peacekeeping forces should be 
withdrawn into barracks. Investigation of any 
incidents should be carried out by the UN-
mandated international observer mission, whose 
mandate would also include monitoring and 
verifying the implementation of all aspects of a 
final settlement agreement, including its security 
aspects.  
In line with the 1993 CSCE Report No. 
13, the Sides should consider demilitarisation of 
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Moldova, i.e., disbanding all military forces. A 
border police could be retained and operate in 
cooperation and under the initial supervision of a 
re-mandated EUBAM and under overall control 
of the international observer mission. Police 
forces, operating within a unified legal and 
constitutional order of Moldova, could 
nonetheless be placed under the separate control 
of the Sides, thus requiring only minimal 
integration. This practice of local control of 
police forces is common in many states and 
could be guaranteed in the constitution and/or a 
special status law by assigning competence for 
law and order to the federated entities, as is the 
case, for example, in Northern Ireland. 
These security provisions should be 
codified in a separate protocol, and should be 
subject to review after five years, with any 
changes requiring the consent of both Sides and 
the guarantors as foreseen in similar ways in 
existing proposals. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
While the case of the Transnistrian conflict in 
Moldova has many distinct features, it is not 
wholly unique among contemporary intra-state 
territorial disputes. Many of these involve 
similar territorial disputes and have implications 
beyond the immediate locality of the conflict, 
including external powers with significant stakes 
in the outcome. On the basis of an analysis of 
existing proposals for the settlement of the 
conflict over Transnistria, a multiple asymmetric 
federacy arrangement negotiated within the 
current 5+2 format of talks seems a reasonable 
framework within which the conflict parties 
might agree a permanent set of institutions that 
provides a full and final, as well as sustainable 
settlement. 
A key part of such a settlement will be 
the extent to which guarantees for both sides are 
built into the settlement and the extent to which 
it will be entrenched in the domestic legal and 
constitutional order of Moldova and in 
international law. On the basis of the foregoing 
discussion, summarised in Table 2 below, four 
different types of guarantees, reflected to some 
extent across all existing proposals, are of 
relevance and are cutting across the different 
substantive issue areas on which the Sides need 
to reach agreement.  
First, there are in/formal agreements for 
a whole settlement or specific provisions that 
detail how parties envisage operation and 
implementation of settlement provisions. For 
example, the parties should agree a range of 
principles that determine their mutual conduct in 
terms of coordinating legislation and policy. 
This could include the creation of consultation 
bodies and a determination of their working 
procedures. Another option might be to make 
the currently existing Working Groups 
permanent or extend their existence into a 
transitional period, both with appropriately 
amended mandates and terms of reference, and 
extending to security arrangements. 
Second, the different federated entities 
will all require status entrenchment in the legal 
order and the constitution of Moldova that 
guarantee their territorial status, protect the 
competences that they have been assigned, and 
ensure the operation of appropriate power-
sharing and dispute resolution mechanisms, as 
well guaranteeing individual and communal 
rights. This has already been accomplished for 
the status of Gagauzia: a constitutional 
anchoring of the status of Gagauzia as a special 
entity in Moldova (currently Article 111 of the 
constitution) and an organic law (dating back to 
1995) that specifies, among other things, the 
competences of Gagauzia. This could be applied 
to settlements for Transnistria and possibly 
Bender. At present, changes to his law require a 
three‐ fifths majority in parliament. This could 
be strengthened, in line with suggestions in the 
Kozak Memorandum and the Mediator 
Proposals, by requiring the consent of the 
parliament of the respective entity for any 
changes to its status or competences.  
Third, ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ international 
guarantees will be useful not only to entrench 
any settlement internationally but also commit 
external parties to a settlement. This could take 
two forms in the case of the Transnistrian 
conflict. On the one hand, achieving a settlement 
in the current 5+2 format would involve Ukraine 
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and Russia as guarantor states, with OSCE as the 
lead mediator and the US and EU as observers. 
This is clearly foreseen in a number of past 
proposals. In addition, a bilateral 
(Moldova‐ Russia) or multilateral treaty 
(involving all states parties involved in the 5+2 
format), along the lines of the 1991 Cambodia 
Agreement or the 2004 Annan Plan for Cyprus 
could prove useful and effective in assuring the 
parties. Finally, international practice would also 
seem to recommend provisions for the direct 
applicability and/or incorporation into domestic 
law of international treaties, conventions and 
standards for the protection of human and 
minority rights. 
Fourth, security guarantees, need to 
address issues of transition from current security 
arrangements alongside longer-term issues of 
security for both Sides. Here the suggestion is to 
establish a UN-mandated international observer 
mission to assume overall control of security 
arrangements and monitor and verify the 
implementation and operation of the full and 
final settlement, including all its security 
provisions. 
These guarantee options are just that—
options that the Sides may want to consider as 
and when they agree on the substance of a final 
settlement of their conflict. They cannot replace 
the settlement itself, but they can give the sides 
confidence that any agreement they reach can be 
appropriately secured in the domestic legislation 
and the Moldovan constitutional order, as well 
as in international law. 
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Table 2: Guarantee Options for a Final Settlement of the Transnistria Conflict 
 
 Territorial Status Distribution of Powers Power Sharing Dispute Resolution Russian Dimension Protection of Identities Security Guarantees 
In
/f
o
rm
al
 A
gr
e
e
m
e
n
ts
 
 Agreements on interpretation of final settlement (e.g., clarification of meaning of mechanisms and 
procedures) 
 Agreements on mechanisms and procedures for cooperation between the Sides in each substantive 
area of the final settlement 
 Consultation/implementation bodies for different policy areas 
 Permanence of existing Working Groups to act as coordination bodies 
  Permanent 
coordination 
committee on 
education policy 
 Special protocol on 
security issues, 
subject to review 
after five years, and 
changes requiring 
consent of the Sides 
and guarantors 
 Creation of an 
internationally 
enlarged version of 
the JCC 
‘S
im
p
le
’ L
e
gi
sl
at
io
n
: 
“S
p
e
ci
a
l S
ta
tu
s 
La
w
” 
 Provisions on 
territorial status, 
subject to specific 
voting procedure for 
passage and 
amendment, 
including parallel 
consent in 
Transnistrian 
legislature 
 Provisions on 
competences, 
subject to specific 
voting procedure for 
passage and 
amendment, 
including parallel 
consent in 
Transnistrian 
legislature  
 Requirement for any 
changes to be 
approved by local 
referendum if 
majority in 
Transnistrian 
parliament below 
60% or if demanded 
by at least 20% of 
deputies or locally 
registered voters 
 Provisions on 
inclusion of 
members of 
Transnistrian 
executive in 
corresponding 
bodies at the centre 
and/or creation of a 
Transnistria ministry 
subject to specific 
voting procedure for 
passage and 
amendment, 
including parallel 
consent in 
Transnistrian 
legislature 
 
 Provisions on a time-
limited mandatory 
conciliation 
procedure and 
trigger mechanism 
subject to specific 
voting procedure for 
passage and 
amendment, 
including parallel 
consent in 
Transnistrian 
legislature 
  Recognition of 
diversity 
 Prohibition of 
discrimination 
 Enumeration of 
‘identity’ rights 
 Concurrent or 
qualified majorities 
for the passage of 
any laws affecting 
identity rights 
 Direct applicability of 
relevant 
international 
standards 
 Competence for 
policing/law and 
order functions 
assigned to entity, 
any changes subject 
to parallel consent in 
Transnistrian 
legislature 
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C
o
n
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
 L
aw
 
 Entrenchment of the 
principle of 
territorial self-
governance 
 Detailed list of 
exclusive (primary 
legislative) and 
concurrent 
(secondary 
legislative) 
competences 
 Option for additional 
delegated (tertiary 
legislative) 
competences 
 Provisions relating to 
specific 
parliamentary voting 
procedures 
(qualified or 
concurrent 
majorities) and the 
policy areas to which 
they apply or the 
procedure by which 
they are triggered  
 Composition of 
constitutional court 
(including the 
prescription of a 
nominations or 
appointments 
procedure) and its 
decision-making 
procedures  
 Equitable 
representation in 
public bodies at all 
levels  
 Competence of the 
constitutional court 
for arbitrating 
disputes between 
centre and federated 
entities 
 Provisions on a 
permanent 
mandatory 
conciliation 
procedure and 
trigger mechanism  
 Permanent 
neutrality enshrined 
in the constitution as 
‘unamendable’ 
article 
 Recognition of 
diversity 
 Prohibition of 
discrimination 
 Enumeration of 
‘identity’ rights 
 Concurrent or 
qualified majorities 
for the passage of 
any laws affecting 
identity rights 
 Direct applicability of 
relevant 
international 
standards 
 Competence for 
policing/law and 
order functions 
assigned to entity, 
any changes subject 
to parallel consent in 
Transnistrian 
legislature 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 L
aw
 
 Status settlement linked with bi/multilateral treaty guaranteeing the whole settlement 
 UN Resolution, including a mandate for an international observer mission to monitor and verify implementation and assume overall responsibility for security arrangements  
 Russian/Moldovan Declaration of Conflict Settlement pursuant to 1992 Ceasefire Agreement 
 ECMI- Working Paper 
 
 
20 | P a g e  
 
Notes 
* The views expressed in this paper are those of the author alone, who writes in his capacity as an 
independent academic, and not of any other organisation or individual. 
 
# A federacy arrangement constitutionally entrenches extensive self-rule for specific entities. It does not 
necessitate territorial sub-divisions across the entire state territory. In other words, federacy 
arrangements are a feature of otherwise unitary states. Examples include the Åland Islands (Finland) and 
South Tyrol (Italy), as well as Gagauzia (Moldova) and Crimea (Ukraine). They can apply to multiple 
entities in an existing state which need not have the same status or identical level of competences. For 
example, Italy has five regions with different special autonomy statutes, while in Denmark, such an 
asymmetric state of affairs applies o Greenland and the Faroer Islands. 
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